English auction

Results: 200



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31Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions Nicolas Fugger University of Cologne Albertus Magnus Platz, 50931, Cologne, Germany,

Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions Nicolas Fugger University of Cologne Albertus Magnus Platz, 50931, Cologne, Germany,

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Source URL: www.wambach.uni-koeln.de

Language: English - Date: 2015-03-16 09:54:15
32Microsoft Word - PDK Book Master afterwordSections IB and IC _Afterword and…

Microsoft Word - PDK Book Master afterwordSections IB and IC _Afterword and…

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Source URL: www.nuff.ox.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2003-12-22 06:10:45
33INFORMATION ACQUISITION DURING A DESCENDING AUCTION VITALI GRETSCHKO AND ACHIM WAMBACH UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE  Abstract. We compare the effects of information acquisition during a descending auction with its static counte

INFORMATION ACQUISITION DURING A DESCENDING AUCTION VITALI GRETSCHKO AND ACHIM WAMBACH UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE Abstract. We compare the effects of information acquisition during a descending auction with its static counte

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Source URL: www.wambach.uni-koeln.de

Language: English - Date: 2013-03-11 12:42:24
34CESifo Working Papers no. 4045

CESifo Working Papers no. 4045

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Source URL: www.wambach.uni-koeln.de

Language: English - Date: 2013-03-11 12:42:24
35Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer∗ forthcoming American Economic Review, 2009 Abstract We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer∗ forthcoming American Economic Review, 2009 Abstract We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when

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Source URL: www.nuff.ox.ac.uk

Language: English - Date: 2009-07-25 15:54:37
36doi:j.jebo

doi:j.jebo

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Source URL: www.personal.psu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-05-10 12:52:03
37COPYRIGHT NOTICE: Paul Klemperer: Auctions: Theory and Practice is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2004, by Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprodu

COPYRIGHT NOTICE: Paul Klemperer: Auctions: Theory and Practice is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2004, by Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprodu

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Source URL: press.princeton.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-02-07 14:38:57
38On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm Han Hong Department of Economics, Stanford University Harry J. Paar

On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the Common-Value Paradigm Han Hong Department of Economics, Stanford University Harry J. Paar

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Source URL: web.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-10-16 21:06:37
39SAM: A Flexible and Secure Auction Architecture Using Trusted Hardware Adrian Perrig Dawn Song 

SAM: A Flexible and Secure Auction Architecture Using Trusted Hardware Adrian Perrig Dawn Song 

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Source URL: www.cs.dartmouth.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-08-18 17:47:04
40Microsoft Word - ausubel-cramton-demand-reduction-and-inefficiency.doc

Microsoft Word - ausubel-cramton-demand-reduction-and-inefficiency.doc

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Source URL: www.ausubel.com

Language: English - Date: 2012-09-06 19:36:38